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Abstract
Drawing on a  analysis of the reform and costs of adult social care commissioned
by Downing Street and the UK Department of Health, this paper sets out projected future
costs under different reform scenarios, reviews what happened in practice from -,
explores the impact of the growing gap between need and funding, and explores the rela-
tionship between future spending and economic growth. In the process, it identifies a ‘lost
decade’ in which policy makers failed to act on the warnings which they received in ,
draws attention to the disproportionate impact of cuts on older people (compared to services
for people of working age) and calls for urgent action before the current system becomes
unsustainable.
Keywords: adult social care; long-term care; older people; disabled people; learning
disability; mental health; carers
Background and introduction
For many years, there has been widespread awareness (among policy makers,
practitioners, researchers, people using services, their families and the media)
that the adult social care system in England needs fundamental reform.
While health care is delivered via a National Health Service available to all based
on clinical need and largely free at the point of delivery, adult social care (prac-
tical assistance for frail or disabled people with activities of daily living such as
getting up, getting washed/dressed, going to the toilet, eating etc) is organised
locally by locally-elected Councils, is means-tested and access depends on meet-
ing increasingly strict eligibility criteria. After an assessment of need by a social
worker, care (if deemed eligible) may be provided from a mix of public, private
and voluntary sector agencies, in a sector characterised by low status and low
pay. Always organised differently and funded less generously than more univer-
sal services such as health care, adult social care has also faced a combination of
pressures arising from demographic change and increased costs, rising need and
demand, and the pursuit (since ) by successive governments of a policy of
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austerity and cuts to public expenditure. This article reviews the reform and
costs of adult social care, drawing on initial analyses commissioned in the late
s to inform government policy in the run up to the  General Election
(Glasby et al., ). These informed, and were quoted, in a subsequent White
Paper (HM Government, , p.) which set out ambitious plans for the cre-
ation of a ‘National Care Service’, with much greater similarities to the National
Health Service than to the previous highly targeted, discretionary and poorly
funded adult social care system. With the election of a new government in
, this was never implemented; the subsequent austerity agenda led to nearly
a decade of spending cuts, service pressures and a growing sense of crisis. By
, there were almost daily warnings of the potential collapse of the current
system, severe and adverse impacts on people with care and support needs (and
their families), a mounting workforce crisis, the bankruptcy of a series of large
care providers, and well-publicised abuse scandals (National Audit Office, ;
BBC, a-b; Holt, ; Local Government Association, ; House of Lords
Economic Affairs Committee, ).
Against this background, this paper reviews what happened to adult social
care spending from  to the present day, comparing this with the reform and
spending scenarios we set out in . Given a massive shortfall in available
funds and the financial/service pressures facing adult social care, we also explore
how the growing gap between need and funding is currently being plugged – and
the severe impacts this is having on people’s lives. The paper then projects future
funding and its share of regional gross value added (GVA, a commonmeasure of
the value of goods and services), enabling us to set out spending on adult social
care as a proportion of the overall value of the economy to . To our knowl-
edge, this is the first analysis of its kind to present policy makers with different
scenarios for adult social care funding and reform, to view these in practice (by
comparing them to nearly a decade of policy) and to set out the relationship
between future economic growth and the provision of sustainable adult social
care. In the process, the paper sets out the very different ways in which spending
has changed for working age adults and older people, with older people bearing
the brunt of social care funding cuts in terms of unmet need, greater levels of
self-funding, poor quality and greater pressure on families. This paper focuses
on the adult social care system in England, but most developed countries are
struggling with similar pressures (Colombo et al., ). This was also the case
even before the world-wide recession (Tarricone and Tsouros, ; Australian
Government Productivity Commission, ; Glendinning, ), and current
pressures are not merely the product of austerity.
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Adult social care reform and funding up to 2010
In , Downing Street and the (then) Department of Health commissioned a
review of the social and economic benefits of adult social care reform (Glasby
et al., ). We described an English social care system widely recognised as
‘broken’, by commentators, policy makers, service users and families alike.
Our report outlined the drivers of increasing social care demand, including
demographic change and changes in family structure. We discussed the sources
of perceived injustices in the existing system, including rising public expecta-
tions and increasing concerns about geographical and economic equity. We
described a sense of ‘crisis’ in terms of funding, fairness and perception and pro-
vided an overview of the recent history of adult social care policy responses to
these issues, setting out five key rationales for reforming adult social care:
. Maintaining social and public expectations that the state will provide a degree
of collective support to its most vulnerable citizens;
. Supporting people to have greater choice and control over their services, and
hence over their lives;
. Enabling people to remain independent for as long as possible so that their
needs do not deteriorate into a future/costly crisis;
. Providing support to those in need so that they can contribute fully as active
citizens; and
. Reducing some of the negative impacts of poor social care on families and indi-
viduals who care for others.
In addition, we reviewed the evidence for five potential mechanisms for
reform pursued by successive governments over time which seemed likely to
continue to influence future policy:
. Strategic commissioning – seeking best value for money by securing services
from a mixed economy of care;
. Greater collaboration between health and social care (on the assumption that
local agencies working together might meet needs more effectively and
reduce the costs of operating independently of each other);
. Personalisation – utilising direct payments and personal budgets to achieve
better outcomes for either the same (or potentially slightly less) money for
some user groups;
. Technology – with potential to provide better support to people through a
system of telecare as well as to improve the efficiency of current working
practices;
. Workforce reform – reducing the costs associated with unfilled vacancies, use
of agency staff and absenteeism.
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In particular, we reviewed the impact each of these reform mechanisms
might potentially have, setting out three future scenarios for future adult social
care reforms and costs. In , a formal review of health care spending
commissioned by the government and undertaken by Sir Derek Wanless, a lead-
ing banker, projected different spending scenarios for the NHS. This was picked
up with enthusiasm by the (then) New Labour government and led to significant
increases in NHS funding in order to try to achieve a ‘fully engaged’ scenario
(Wanless, , preface: Letter to the Chancellor of the Exchequer) in which:
“Levels of public engagement in relation to their health are high. Life expectancy increases
go beyond current forecasts, health status improves dramatically and people are confident
in the health system and demand high quality care. The health service is responsive with
high rates of technology uptake, particularly in relation to disease prevention. Use of
resources is more efficient.”
Although the Review also recommended a similar process be undertaken in
social care, this recommendation was not taken up by the government. Building
on this approach, we set out three similar scenarios for social care:
• Slow uptake: future policy and practice remain as now, with periodic attempts
to more fully integrate health and social care, but without sustained and real
change; little permanent workforce reform; some support for carers; ongoing
preventative/rehabilitative pilots, but a failure to embed these in mainstream
services; and low uptake of technology. This scenario describes a system
which tries to meet basic social expectations by providing a bare minimum,
albeit with some aspiration to higher quality and more responsive rights-
based services. Despite a stated commitment to longer-term change, action
is limited and sporadic, with the commitment more rhetoric than reality.
Under this scenario, costs increase at a rate of % per year (Figures a-c), lead-
ing to a doubling of adult social care costs within two decades.
• Solid progress: while the stated aims of policy remain similar, there is a more
concerted effort to improve outcomes and deliver savings through integration;
a greater understanding/embedding of the principles of personalisation; a
genuine and sustained attempt to rebalance mainstream services towards a
more preventative/rehabilitative approach (i.e. to move away from a ‘fire-
fighting’ approach which focuses on meeting the needs of people in crisis,
to one which can increase investment in prevention and rehabilitation to help
people remain living independently at home, or to return home after a spell in
hospital if they have experienced some sort of crisis in their health); a sus-
tained commitment to a commissioning-led system; greater support for
carers; significant workforce reform; and more innovative use of IT. In prac-
tice, the intended benefits are not fully realized to quite the extent envisaged
(for example, integration does not deliver as much as expected, and the impact
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of personalisation is reduced by professional and cultural barriers). Over time,
thinking retreats to meeting basic needs, extending some rights and trying to
boost prevention/rehabilitation. Under this scenario, costs are contained at
current levels.
• Fully engaged: there is a sustained commitment to genuine change, motivated
by a desire to realize in full the benefits for the health and social care system
and for wider society. Where the evidence base is currently contested or
unclear, the mechanisms used surpass expectations and start to really deliver.
Thus, partnerships achieve the outcomes/savings that intuition suggests they
ought; commissioning proves an effective lever for reforming the system; per-
sonalisation is experienced as a lived reality by front-line staff and service
users; there are high rates of technology take-up; and there is effective and
ongoing workforce reform. This approach is underpinned by a genuine com-
mitment to a rights-based approach, to mainstreaming prevention and reha-
bilitation, and to using social care funding to achieve a much broader range of
social and economic benefits for users and carers. Under this scenario, there is
a % reduction in costs (albeit the assumptions about what may be possible to
achieve verge on the heroic).
To our knowledge, this was the first time the ‘Wanless scenarios’ – influ-
ential in persuading New Labour to significantly increase NHS spending, essen-
tially tripling the health care budget over their period in office – were applied to
adult social care, and the first analysis to present policy makers with such
detailed projections for different levels of commitment to reform. Ultimately,
our review highlighted the high costs of inaction – on existing demographic
trends and with standard cost assumptions, we concluded that the real costs
of adult social care (that is, after allowing for inflation) could double within
two decades. Moreover, this would be the case for current services and
approaches (which had already been strongly criticised for failing to fully
and appropriately meet need), leading to significantly higher costs with no
improvement in the quality of care. Even under our most optimistic and
demanding scenario of ‘full engagement’, real spending on social care would
merely be held at its  level.
Adult social care policy and funding since 2010
Following the defeat of New Labour in , the newly elected Conservative/
Liberal Democrat Coalition rejected the previous administration’s White
Paper, publishing its own ‘Vision for Social Care’ (HM Government, ).
This set out seven key principles for reforming the adult social care system,
focusing on prevention, personalisation, partnership, plurality, protection,
productivity and people (Department of Health, , p.). Despite their
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impressive alliteration, these felt no different to previous policy commitments.
The new government also committed to producing a new White Paper, and cre-
ating a sustainable legal and financial framework for adult social care by building
on two key reviews: a legal review (commissioned by the New Labour govern-
ment in ) led by the Law Commission, and a review of funding options for
long-term care (chaired by Sir Andrew Dilnot).
The Law Commission’s review (Law Commission, ), published in May
, surveyed over sixty years of social care law since the National Assistance
Act . It concluded that the law had become confusing and unclear, and pro-
posed a single statute that would integrate existing duties while updating them
with best practice in terms of personalisation, safeguarding and commissioning
(key parts of the current system, but lacking a statutory basis). Its core recom-
mendation was to establish a new, positive legal basis for social care: the duty of
local authorities to promote individual wellbeing, as opposed to ‘meeting need’.
This would also necessitate local authorities thinking about the wellbeing of the
population, not just those individuals fitting pre-defined eligibility criteria.
In July , ‘Fairer Care Funding’: the report of the Commission on
Funding of Care and Support was published (Dilnot, ). This argued that care
remains the last large uninsurable social risk: private insurers had failed to pro-
duce products that enable people to pool this risk through the market, and indi-
viduals can face catastrophic costs that cannot be predicted in advance (no one
knows who will need care and who will not). In response, the report proposed
raising the asset threshold from the existing £, to £,, expanding the
number of people who would receive state-funded care. It also proposed a cap
on the amount any individual would contribute to their care (potentially
£,), thereby helping individuals to plan ahead for future care costs and
encouraging the insurance industry to develop new products.
The government then published a Draft Care and Support Bill (HM
Government, ) in two parts, corresponding to each Commission’s recom-
mendations, later enacted as the Care Act (HM Government, ). This rep-
resented the largest overhaul of adult social care law since the establishment of
the welfare state. Part One of the Care Act was implemented in April ,
alongside other support documents and statutory guidance. The Act:
• Defined adult social care as the promotion of individual wellbeing
• Placed a duty on local authorities to promote prevention and integration
• Established a new right to assessment for carers
• Placed a duty on authorities to maintain an information and advice service for
all residents
• Placed a duty on authorities to facilitate a diverse, vibrant and sustainable
market for care and support services that benefit the whole population
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• Established a right to advocacy if a person lacks the capacity to be fully
engaged in statutory social care functions
• Established national eligibility criteria for social care assessments
• Placed a duty on authorities to make safeguarding enquiries and establish an
‘Adult Safeguarding Board’made up of local stakeholders, including the NHS
and police.
Part Two of the Care Act set out the government’s response to the Dilnot
Commission. It set an increased upper capital limit of £, for care home
residents (including the value of their home) and £, for those who receive
care at home. It also set an increased lower capital limit of £, and an overall
cap on expenditure of £,. These changes were marked for implementation
in April . Government also set out an aspiration that by defining care cost
liability, interest in developing care insurance products would be stimulated in
the private insurance market.
Although Part Two of the Care Act was much less generous than recom-
mended by the Dilnot Commission, the newly elected Conservative government
(-) baulked at its practical and cost implications and delayed enactment of
Part Two of the Act, later abandoning it altogether (see Jarrett, ,  for an
overview of a number of the key events set out in the paragraph below).
Following Theresa May’s election as leader, the Conservatives pledged to publish
a Green Paper putting forward new proposals. During the General Election
campaign (Conservative Party, ), the government set out ideas even further
removed from the Dilnot recommendations: eschewing the lifetime cap and
proposing to include the value of people’s homes when means-testing for home
care (as well as for residential care). Negative reaction to the proposals was seen
as a key factor in the loss of the Conservative’s overall majority, with many per-
ceiving the changes to be regressive and/or a reduction in service. Political oppo-
nents labelled the changes a ‘Dementia Tax’, and the policy (which seemed to
have been developed in a small inner circle without adequate consultation and
debate) quickly unravelled. During a press conference to discuss the proposals,
May declared ‘nothing has changed’ while also announcing a possible cap on
costs and that yet further proposals would be set out in the government
Green Paper, previously announced in the March  Budget. In the context
of Brexit negotiations, the government has delayed this Green Paper’s publica-
tion multiple times; it remains unpublished at time of writing. There have been
at least  government Green/White Papers, vision documents and independent
reviews since  (Jarrett, ), yet we are no closer to reforming the funding
of adult social care than twenty years ago. Indeed, of proposals relating specifi-
cally to funding, none of the main recommendations have been implemented,
and it is difficult to believe it will be th time lucky.
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In spite of the focus of the Care Act on promoting wellbeing, many have
argued that the laudable intentions of the new legislation were instantly under-
mined by the ‘austerity’ agenda begun by the Coalition Government in .
This was described by one council leader as ‘the end of local government as
we know it’ (Glasby, ) and the Local Government Association calculates
councils will have lost almost p in every £ central government provides
for local services (-) (https://www.local.gov.uk/about/news/funding-
black-hole). Our own analysis (Figure ) shows that local authority spending
on adult social care increased in real terms until . Thereafter it declined
(despite increases in need and demand), with an % reduction in gross spending
between - and -. Moreover, Figure  shows a massive reduction in
the real growth rate of gross spending on adult social care and in the ratio of
gross spending to Gross Value Added. Although councils protected social care
expenditure relative to other areas of local government expenditure over the
period, additional demographic pressures, broader funding pressures and
increases in costs (such as the implementation of the National Living Wage)
have culminated in a sense of ‘crisis’ in publicly funded adult social care services,
and per adult spending fell by .% over the period (Humphries et al., ). In
recognition of these pressures, piecemeal injections of additional funding have
been needed (for example, with government allowing local authorities to place
Figure . Gross expenditure on adult social care
Source: Adult Social Care Activity and Finance Report, England - for -, NHS
Digital; Personal Social Services: Expenditure and Unit Costs England, - for -,
NHS Digital; GDP deflators at market prices, and money GDP September , HM Treasury,

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an additional charge on local Council Tax, and some transfers of funding from
NHS budgets). Consequentially, gross adult social care spending reached £.
billion, with a slight in-year increase in  (albeit still lower than in )
(Cromarty, ).
Returning to our  analysis, we characterise the last ten years as a ‘lost
decade’ for adult social care. Although the Care Act is now on the statute book,
its influence on what is happening has in practice been minimal. Indeed an early
review carried out by the Minister responsible for steering the legislation
through Parliament found that (regarding the experience of carers, at least)
the new law was too often poorly understood or ignored – and that the answer
to the question of ‘has this made a difference?’ was ‘not yet’ (Carers Trust, ).
Moreover, for many commentators, the failure of successive governments to
move beyond platitudes and re-statements of previous policy towards anything
substantive has been simply appalling (see, for example, Glasby, ;
Humphries et al., ; Butler, ; House of Commons Health and Social
Care and Housing, Communities and Local Government Committees, ;
Age UK, ; Johnson, ). There is no evidence of any real progress with
the five main reform mechanisms we identified in  and, indeed, quite a lot
of evidence that previous attempts to pursue such policies have either stalled or
gone backwards (Table ).
Figure . Real growth rate of gross expenditure on adult social care
Source: Adult Social Care Activity and Finance Report, England - for -, NHS
Digital; Personal Social Services: Expenditure and Unit Costs England, - for -,
NHS Digital; GDP deflators at market prices, and money GDP September , HM Treasury;
Regional gross value added (income approach), December , ONS.
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TABLE . Progress with key reforms
Reform mechanism Evidence of potential impact (Glasby et al., ) Progress since 
Strategic
commissioning
A key feature of government policy over time, albeit limited
international evidence for the claims made by policy makers
(particularly in health and care services)
Significant reaction against market-based reforms in English health
and social care (e.g. Dickinson et al., ; Hudson, ). High
profile provider failures have raised further questions about the
ability of ‘commissioning’ to deliver aspirations
Health and social care
partnerships
Longstanding belief that joint working may improve outcomes and
reduce costs – albeit evidence of the latter is limited. Projections
from one very integrated health and social care system suggested
scope for significant impact on use of NHS resources
Health and social care partnerships remain challenging, with a
tendency for national policy/local initiatives to over-promise and
under-deliver. The integrated system used as a basis for our
initial  projections (Glasby et al., ) was abolished as a
result of the Coalition’s health reforms (Farnsworth, ).
Subsequent policy has been perceived as focusing more on
internal NHS integration than on health and social care
Personalisation Promising early results from pilots and an early national evaluation
– albeit this is a complex and contested area of policy and
practice, and the nature of the evidence base is widely debated
Some positives for individuals achieved, but significant
disillusionment with how this policy has been implemented in
practice, in a difficult financial environment. One of the
architects of these reforms has described the risk of ‘zombie
personalisation’ rather than genuine transformation (Duffy,
)
Technology In other non-care sectors, technology is transforming the delivery
of services and traditional ways of working – albeit benefits in
adult social care have been more limited
Aspirations remain high, but evidence of actual change and of
significant financial savings remains limited. A high profile
government policy to promote telecare produced
underwhelming results when formally evaluated (Henderson
et al., )
Workforce reform Significant scope to reduce costs via tackling vacancies, turnover,
sickness and use of agency staff
Failure to tackle longstanding issues, rising sense of a workforce
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Of the three scenarios set out in , this is worse than ‘slow uptake’, and –
had funding remained available – we would expect the cost of adult social care to
have rocketed. However, adult social care spending is heavily constrained by the
availability of local government funding more generally, and it is possible to
shed light on these seeming impossible financial and service pressures by com-
paring what happened in practice with our initial  projections
(Figure a-c).
Between  and , local authority spending on social care for work-
ing-age people with physical impairments, learning disabilities or mental health
problems was broadly consistent with or slightly above a ‘slow uptake’ scenario
(increasing at an overall rate of around % per year). Given broader cuts to local
government funding, this is a significant cost pressure – but spending has at least
(broadly) kept pace with what we might have expected from our  projec-
tions. Over the same period, however, spending on older people’s social care
departed dramatically from our projections. In Figures b-c, spending on older
people (both on their residential/nursing care and on community services
including home care services) fell significantly in real terms, to well below
the levels needed to sustain previous services, even in the most challenging,
ambitious and optimistic of our scenarios.
Given the ‘lost decade’ summarised above, a significant gap has thus opened
between the rising cost of maintaining current services and the actual money
spent. Actual spending on residential/nursing care for older people in 
was £,million, for instance, while projected spending, under a ‘slow uptake’
scenario, was £, million. Actual spending in  and projected spending
under a ‘slow uptake’ scenario on day and domiciliary provision for older people
were £, million and £, million respectively. This raises profound ques-
tions about the impact this disparity may be having on service users, staff and
other services.
The impact of spending reductions
With need and costs projected to rise significantly, and spending, especially on
older people’s services, falling dramatically, our review of the evidence/analysis
suggests that six key impacts are emerging:
. Increasing levels of unmet/under-met need and rising levels of ‘self-funding’:
based on an analysis of the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing, Age
UK () estimates that the number of older people who do not receive
adequate support with ‘Activities of Daily Living’ (getting out of bed, going
to the toilet, getting washed and dressed, etc.) increased to .million people
in . This means one in seven older people (% of the  population)
was living with some level of unmet need (an increase of % since ).
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Figures . a-c: Projected v actual spending (public adult social care funding) at  prices,
-
a. Gross spending on working-age adults (£m in real terms) with physical impairments, learn-
ing disabilities or mental health problems
b. Spending on residential/nursing care for older people () (£m in real terms)
c. Spending on community services for older people - day and domiciliary provision (£m in
real terms)
Source for all  Figures: Glasby et al. ; Personal Social Services: Expenditure and Unit
Costs England, -, NHS Digital; Adult Social Care Activity and Finance: England,
-, NHS Digital
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When the definition is broadened to ‘Instrumental Activities of Daily Living’
(shopping, cooking, managing medication, etc.), the number of older people
who do not get the help they need rises to . million. Overall, an estimated
, fewer older people are receiving social care as eligibility criteria have
tightened in response to insufficient resources (Age UK, ). When this
happens, extra pressure is placed on families (see below) and more people
are forced to make their own arrangements, as best they can, in the absence
of public support, by arranging and paying for their own care where this is
feasible. Although it is difficult to obtain accurate information on levels of
self-funding, latest UK Household Longitudinal Survey (UKHLS) data sug-
gest around , people fund their own home care or care home places in
England, many more than previously thought (Henwood et al., ).
Moreover, unlike other areas of life where having financial resources opens
up new choices and opportunities, self-funders tend to be isolated, margin-
alised and disadvantaged compared to people receiving publicly-funded sup-
port, and pay a premium of some % for their residential/nursing care,
effectively cross-subsidising council-funded residents (Henwood et al., ).
. Quality of care: where people are receiving social care support, there are
increasing pressures on quality. The House of Commons Health and
Social Care and Housing, Communities and Local Government
Committees observe (, p.):
“The quality of care provided is also suffering. We heard it described as ‘extremely
patchy’, ‘variable’ and that the care given to people with dementia was often lower qual-
ity : : : Caroline Abrahams, Charity Director at Age UK, explained how the challenges in
the workforce affected quality: ‘lack of continuity, never seeing the same person twice
[ : : : ] rushed visits – maybe quarter of an hour rushing in and out – with no time to
establish a proper relationship, let alone real communication’.”
. Pressures on carers: the growth in unmet need is also reflected in growing
pressure on carers (family members, friends and neighbours who provide
unpaid support for people with social care needs). In the annual budget sur-
vey of Directors of Adult Social Services, well over a quarter felt cuts to serv-
ices had already reduced quality of life for carers, and many more expected
this to be the case in future (ADASS, ). In the State of Caring survey
, over one-third of carers (%) responding described themselves as
“struggling to make ends meet”, while only one in ten felt confident that
the support they receive and rely upon will continue (Carers UK, ).
Nearly three-quarters (%) said they had suffered mental ill health as a
result of caring and % reported physical ill health as a result of caring.
Data provided by NHS Digital (a) suggest that the proportion of carers
reporting negative effects on their health has increased since -, with
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more carers reporting feeling tired, having disturbed sleep, general feelings of
stress and feeling depressed.
. Pressures on staff: a review of the adult social care workforce (National Audit
Office, ) identified high overall turnover rates (.% in -) and
vacancy levels (.% in -, and even higher for the care worker and
registered nurse sub-categories), exacerbated by the difficulty of recruiting
to low paid, low status roles. The House of Commons Communities and
Local Government Committee () has also drawn attention to the stress-
ful and uncertain nature of care work, with many members of social care staff
facing low wages, zero hours contracts and poor training. In , .% of
care workers left within a year of starting (p.) and the mean number of sick-
ness days for directly employed adult social care staff in local authorities was
. days per year (compared with . days for all workers nationally) (NHS
Digital, b, p.).
. Pressures on service providers: as the gap between need and funding widens,
the provider market –mainly for-profit providers – has faced severe and sus-
tained financial pressures. In , a Competition and Markets Authority
study of care homes in England (Competition and Markets Authority,
) concluded that existing (primarily publicly-funded) care home mar-
kets would prove to be unsustainable at current rates paid by local authori-
ties. The ADASS (, p.) Budget Survey revealed that “% of Councils
(up from % last year) reported that providers in their area had closed, ceased
trading or handed back contracts in the last six months, with thousands of
individuals affected as a consequence.” There have also been widespread
media reports of national providers (both in home care and residential care),
such as Allied Healthcare and Four Seasons, facing severe financial problems
and potential bankruptcy (Care Quality Commission, ).
. Pressures on partner agencies: when access to adult social care is significantly
reduced, pressure can increase on the NHS (a universal service, free at the
point of delivery, and unable to ‘say no’ to people in need in the way adult
social care can). In recent years, vociferous campaigning to boost adult social
care spending by various NHS bodies (see, for example, Dickson, ) has
seen the NHS use its greater popularity, visibility and political capital to
advocate on behalf of social care partners. A particular pressure point has
been older people medically fit for discharge from hospital who are unable
to vacate their bed due to lack of capacity in community services. Internal
NHS factors account for most delays, but since  waiting for social care
services has grown as a reason for this. By October , the most common
reason for delay was patients awaiting a care package in their own home
(rolling average of , patients delayed per day) while the third most com-
mon was awaiting a nursing home placement (rolling average of  patients
delayed per day). Between August  and February , , more
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patients per day were delayed for social care-related reasons, a % increase
(Nuffield Trust, ). Most debate has centred on the knock-on effects of
the social care crisis on the NHS, but pressures have also been reported on
the police and other services (see, for example, Cottam, ). Our 
analysis also demonstrated that spending on adult social care can affect peo-
ple’s ability to work and social security spending, so it seems likely cuts in
adult social care and social security also affect other partner agencies.
Long-term cost projections
Our cost projections for adult social care are based on assumptions about the
proportion of people who will receive support from local authorities, the move-
ment of the population, changes in the unit cost of social care and Gross Value
Added (GVA), and stability in adult social care policies (see Annex for details).
Existing studies focus on projecting adult social care spending (e.g. Wittenberg
et al., ), but do not explore if local authorities and the government can meet
increased care demand. Tax revenue, a primary resource for adult social care
support, is closely related to local economies, which can be measured by
GVA. We therefore use GVA as a proxy for government’s financial capacity
and project the ratio of gross spending on adult social care to GVA. The purpose
of this projection is to emphasise the importance of the government budget
(economic growth) when examining the sustainability of the adult social care
system.
Our data source for adult social care expenditure is the finance return (PSS-
EX), now replaced (from ) by the Adult Social Care Finance Return (ASC-
FR). The ASC-FR introduces new classifications [Long-Term (LT) and Short-
Term (ST) support], posing comparability problems post-, especially for
primary support and service provision. LT support refers to continuous care
to maintain an individual’s quality of life, provided in a nursing, residential
or community setting; ST support is time-limited and aims to maximise an indi-
vidual’s independence, reducing their future need for support. Based on the new
classification framework, we project gross spending on LT and ST support for
older people () and the working-age population, as well as the correspond-
ing ratio of spending to total GVA, for  to ; our projections are based
on the three scenarios used in our  analysis. We assume that the proportion
of older people who receive support from local authorities for LT or ST support
are constant. With constant ratios and -based population projections from
the ONS, we project the number of people receiving support. Projected costs are
the product of the number of people receiving support, the real costs of this in
 and the assumed growth rate of real costs. From  to , the average
GVA growth rate in real terms was approximately %. We therefore assume
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GVA increases by % annually for our projection period. The ratio of spending
on adult social care to GVA is calculated by dividing projected spending
by GVA.
We assume that the number of people who receive local authority funded
care support changes with ONS population projections. In , , people
aged  received LT support; this increases to , in  (Table ). For
‘slow uptake’ and ‘solid progress’ scenarios, projected gross spending on LT sup-
port for older people increases, respectively, from £,m in  to £,m
and £,m in . Spending is projected to fall, to £,m in  and to
£,m in , under a ‘fully engaged’ scenario. Figure  displays the share of
TABLE . Projected gross spending on long-term care for older people ()
(£m)
     
The number of people
receiving care
, , , , , ,
Spending – fully engaged      
Spending – solid progress      
Spending – slow uptake      
Figure . Projected gross spending on long-term support for older people (% GVA)
Source: -based population projection, ONS; Regional gross value added (income
approach), ONS; Adult Social Care Activity and Finance: England, -, NHS Digital
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spending to GVA in England, which decreases in the ‘solid progress’ and ‘fully
engaged’ scenarios, from .% in  to .% and .%, respectively, in
. Under ‘slow uptake’, the share is projected to increase to .% in 
and to .% in .
In , the number of working-age people receiving LT support was
, (Table ), increasing to , in  and , in . In a ‘fully
engaged’ scenario, spending on LT support will decrease from £,m ()
to £,m in  and to £,m in . Under ‘solid progress’ and ‘slow
uptake’ scenarios, it will increase to £,m and £,m respectively. The
share of spending to GVA decreases from .% in  to .% in  with
‘solid progress’, and to .% under a ‘fully engaged’ scenario (Figure ). If the
TABLE . Projected gross spending on long-term support for working-age
people (£m)
     
The number of people receiving care      
Spending – fully engaged      
Spending – solid progress      
Spending – slow uptake      
Figure . Projected gross spending on long-term support for working-age people (% GVA)
Source: -based population projection, ONS; Regional gross value added (income
approach), ONS; Adult Social Care Activity and Finance: England, -, NHS Digital
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average cost increases by % annually (‘slow uptake’), this share will increase to
.% in  and to .% in .
The number of people aged  receiving ST care was , in 
(Table ) and projected to increase to , in  and to , in
. Under a ‘solid progress’ scenario, gross expenditure will rise from
£m in  to £m in , and to £,m under a ‘slow-uptake’ sce-
nario. Spending is projected to fall, to £m in  under a ‘fully engaged’
scenario, while the share of spending to GVA decreases to .% (Figure ).
The share will also drop under a ‘solid progress’ scenario (to .%), although
gross spending increases. We project that the share will increase to .%
under the ‘slow uptake’ scenario.
TABLE . Projected gross spending on short-term care for older people (£m)
     
Number of people receiving support      
Spending – fully engaged      
Spending – solid progress      
Spending – slow uptake      
Figure . Projected gross spending on short-term support for older people (% GVA)
Source: -based population projection, ONS; Regional gross value added (income
approach), ONS; Adult Social Care Activity and Finance: England, -, NHS Digital
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The number of working-age people receiving ST support was , in
 and will increase slightly, to ,, by  and to , by 
(Table ). Gross spending on ST support for this group was £m in .
Spending is projected to remain constant and to increase slightly to £m
in  under a ‘solid progress’ scenario. Under a ‘fully engaged’ scenario, how-
ever, spending will fall to £m in , while under a ‘slow uptake’ scenario it
increases to £m. Along with economic growth, the share of spending to GVA
decreases dramatically under ‘solid progress’ and ‘fully engaged’ scenarios
(Figure ). The share will slightly increase (from .% in  to .% in
) under a ‘slow uptake’ scenario.
TABLE . Projected gross spending on short-term care for working-age
people (£m)
     
Number of people receiving support      
Spending – fully engaged      
Spending – solid progress      
Spending – slow uptake      
Figure . Projected gross spending on short-term support for working-age people (% GVA)
Source: -based population projection, ONS; Regional gross value added (income
approach), ONS; Adult Social Care Activity and Finance: England, -, NHS Digital
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Figure  displays the projected share of gross public spending on all adult
care services to GVA. Between  and , the share reached a .% high
in  and a .% low in ; we include these historical upper and lower
bound values (using dashed reference lines in the figure) to reference our pro-
jections. The proportion of gross spending on adult social care to GVA was
.% in  – above the lower reference. Under a ‘fully engaged’ scenario,
the share will decrease, and go below the lower reference, by , as it will (by
) under a ‘solid progress’ scenario. Even in the ‘slow uptake’ scenario (where
gross expenditure on adult social care is expected to increase), the share of
spending to GVA will still be below the upper reference level. This suggests gov-
ernments will be able to meet increased demand for adult social care if the econ-
omy grows at % annually, but that the availability of future funding for it is
inextricably linked to the future performance of the economy.
Figures - show the projected share of gross spending under different
growth rate conditions. In Figures -, the growth rate of GVA is assumed
to increase by %, .%, and %, respectively. If governments maintain the cur-
rent ‘slow uptake’ scenario, the share of gross expenditure on adult social care to
GVA will exceed the upper reference line by  (given % economic growth),
 (given .% economic growth) and by  (if the economy stays at 
growth levels). If the share exceeds the upper boundary, it may be difficult for
government to meet increased demand for social care. When investigating
Figure . Projected gross spending on adult social care (% GVA)
Source: -based population projection, ONS; Regional gross value added (income
approach), ONS; Adult Social Care Activity and Finance: England, -, NHS Digital
          
of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0047279420000288
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 90.215.39.28, on 03 Sep 2021 at 16:27:17, subject to the Cambridge Core terms
Figures  Projected gross spending on adult social care (% GVA) - GVA increases by %
annually
Source: -based population projection, ONS; Regional gross value added (income
approach), ONS; Adult Social Care Activity and Finance: England, -, NHS Digital
Figures  Projected gross spending on adult social care (% GVA) - GVA increases by .%
annually
Source: -based population projection, ONS; Regional gross value added (income
approach), ONS; Adult Social Care Activity and Finance: England, -, NHS Digital
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sustainable funding for adult social care, our projections emphasise the need to
consider economic growth and early implementation of reforms. As the popu-
lation ages, the government’s financial burden will increase, and available funds
for implementing reform will decrease.
Discussion and Conclusion
This paper portrays ‘a lost decade’ in which previous reforms and New Labour’s
investment stalled and, in many cases, began to go backwards. Although our
 analysis concluded that ‘doing nothing’ was not an option, when New
Labour lost the  General Election, its proposed adult social care reforms
were instantly jettisoned. Despite the Care Act , policy in the subsequent
decade has been even less ambitious than the ‘slow uptake’ scenario we pre-
sented to government as the least attractive/feasible approach (leading to no
increase in quality and a doubling of adult social care costs within two decades).
Predictably, the result has been greater unmet/under-met need, more self-fund-
ing, lower quality care, a crisis among care providers, and much greater pressure
on staff, families and partner agencies. Unless something significant changes,
current pressures will only increase, and the adult social care system will quickly
become unsustainable (if this point has not already been reached).
The impact of these funding pressures is not being felt equally by older people
and people of working age and their families. Although most of the media and
policy debate on adult social care focuses on older people (the largest group of
Figures  Projected gross spending on adult social care (% GVA) - No increase in GVA
Source: -based population projection, ONS; Regional gross value added (income
approach), ONS; Adult Social Care Activity and Finance: England, -, NHS Digital
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people using services), the discourse in broader society about the needs of older
people has been extremely negative. In an era of austerity, there have been legiti-
mate debates about the importance of intergenerational equity and the welfare of a
younger generation facing significant economic challenges, increased levels of
anxiety, rising higher education costs, less secure employment, rising house prices,
less secure pensions and (latterly) reduced life expectancy (Kontopantelis, ;
Shaw, ; Yates, ). Within adult social care, however, the cost of care for
people of working age has risen largely as projected, while services for older people
have been cut back severely. There have been vociferous campaigns about the
poor quality of care provided to young people and adults with mental health prob-
lems and learning disabilities (Duffy, ; Mencap, ; TUC, ), yet the
plight of older people has been much less discussed – despite being a national
scandal which ought to generate just as much shock and anger. Underlying this
situation, we identify three inter-related factors:
. A significant number of young people with profound physical impairments,
learning disabilities and/or mental health problems are entering adult social
care services with very profound and expensive needs; their impairments
mean they will need significant support for life. At present, there is little
scope for reducing their need for services via greater prevention or more
active rehabilitation, and costs are likely to increase as more people with such
needs become adults and enjoy far greater life expectancy than in the past.
This is a major achievement of the welfare state, and to be celebrated.
. Expenditure cuts seem to be more acceptable when applied to older people
than when they affect people of working age. Despite the legitimate needs of
other groups, it is hard to interpret the trends in Figures a-c and a-c
other than as (at least in part) the product of ageist attitudes and assumptions
about the role and needs of older people. It seems services for older people
can be cut in ways unimaginable – and which would certainly be more vehe-
mently challenged – if they occurred in other service settings.
. Many of the impacts summarised above involve people and their families
suffering quietly in their own homes – the sheer human misery caused by
our ‘lost decade’ is simply not as visible as financial pressures on more prom-
inent, popular and better understood services (hospitals or schools, for exam-
ple). When social care for older people is cut to the bone, lives are blighted,
distress and pressure increase, and the resilience of individuals and their fam-
ilies is ground down. Yet this happens slowly – day by day, week by week and
month by month. It is not sudden, dramatic or hi-tech in the way a crisis in
an Accident and Emergency department may be, and tends to attract less
media, political and popular attention.
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As well as analysing past and current spending, we have made long-term
projections of adult social care spending based on the ratio of gross spending
as a proportion of GVA. If the economy grows by .% annually, projections
of gross spending on adult social care to GVA, under the ‘slow uptake’ model,
will exceed the highest levels of spending over the past two decades by ; this
will happen by  if the economy stays at  levels, and by  with eco-
nomic growth at %. These findings have two important implications. First, eco-
nomic growth is crucial for sustaining adult social care, and future governments
may be able to close the current funding gap if they pursue significant reforms
and the economy grows significantly. Secondly, it is critical to implement adult
social care reforms as soon as possible: governments will face greater financial
stress the longer they wait to intervene in a system already at breaking point
and in desperate need of reform. With yet more urgency than in , we warn:
‘Doing nothing is NOT an option’.
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Notes
 Government policy over time has separated out the design/purchasing of services (‘commis-
sioning’) from their provision – and this scenario assumes that this policy focus remains, is
taken seriously and starts to deliver some of the stated/assumed benefits
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Appendix: cost projections
2010 analysis
Sources of data: the cost projections discussed throughout the report are based
on a number of simplifying assumptions, applied to data of various kinds. The
data underlying the projections are drawn from:
• ONS population projections – for numbers of people of different ages, and of
different living arrangements (couple versus single). Such data is crown copy-
right (ONS, )
• Census  – for proportions of older people living in residential settings
• BHPS - (wave ) for receiving services among those living at their
own residences (BHPS, )
• PSS expenditure data of different kinds, from the DH Information Centre
• Estimates of the number of disabled people with learning disabilities (from
Emerson and Hatton, )
• Estimates of the work patterns of informal carers, from the Family Resources
Surveys of / and / (the latest available) – DWP, 
• Analysis of the work participation rates of disabled and non-disabled people,
from the quarterly Labour Force Surveys of Jul-Sep  and Jul-Sep 
(ONS, )
• Analysis of sickness absence rates from the same source
Methods: separate ad hoc approaches were used to estimate the potential
cost savings from having more disabled people and carers back in the labour
force. The main assumptions were of pay rates at the minimum wage (pessimis-
tic) and full-time employment (optimistic).
The methodology used to analyse overall spending projections was that of cell-
based simulation. This is a robust approach that has often been deployed to proj-
ect future spending (see, for example, Wittenberg et al., 2008a, 2008b). It is
based on attributing outcomes to pre-specified groups in the population – such
as the chances of being in residential care for groups defined by age, gender and
marital status. The numbers of people in each group change each year, drawing
on data from population projections. The product of the size of the group, and
the associated incidence of care needs, multiplied by a cost factor, generates the
components of the cost projections.
An alternative approach – micro-simulation – may be used to look at results at
the level of individuals, but imposes greater requirements in terms of data and of
programming the models (Wittenberg et al., 1998). Developing new micro-sim-
ulation models was not possible given the short duration of this review. However
it was possible to construct simple cell-based simulations to suggest how
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spending might develop in future if a host of assumptions about the incidence of
care and its costs continue to be met. These were projections, not predictions.
Selecting the scenarios: in our 2010 report we outlined a number of strategies that
might generate cost savings, and improved outcomes. These have been quite
substantial in some instances, but more limited in other areas. There were also
strong and important differences in the robustness of the evidence, and the con-
fidence that may be placed in different estimates of areas of saving.
Even given these factors, it is not possible to simply ‘add up’ the kinds of savings
proposed to reach an overall figure. Some of the savings were in different areas
of spending and so it would be double-counting to include both sets (for exam-
ple, greater personalisation of care budgets, and the role of commissioning).
There was also limited data on whether the cost savings achievable may be
regarded as a ‘one-off’ reduction or instead may be treated as dynamic factors
that continue to reduce future costs by similar proportions. In many cases the
future savings may require upfront investment, in new procedures or infrastruc-
ture, that need to be included in the round.
For these reasons the overall scenarios modelled (a 2% reduction in costs under a
‘fully engaged’ scenario, no change in costs under a ‘solid progress’ scenario, and
a 2% increase in a ‘slow uptake’ scenario) were based on the kinds of figures
found within each strategy and were not attempts to naively sum up the sets
of individual financial assumptions.
What the projections demonstrated was the large momentum built into the
future costs of social care by population change. The overall costs in real terms
continued to increase quite sharply even if there was no change in the real unit
costs of care provision. Even if costs could be cut by two per cent annually in real
terms – a demanding challenge – the effect was barely to constrain real levels of
spending to their current level.
A critical assumption made was that there are no ‘start-up’ costs to the reforms.
In reality many of the proposed reforms might cost more in the short term, even
if they saved money in the longer term. However there was very limited infor-
mation available about the size of such costs, and they had not been a focus for
research.
2019 analysis
Sources of data: the projections on the adult social care cost in this article are
based on a series of assumptions. The data applied in the projections are
obtained from:
• ONS -based population projections – for numbers of people across dif-
ferent ages
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• Adult Social Care Activity and Finance Report, England – - – for the
number of people who receive support by care type and age group and for
spending on adult social care by long-term and short-term support and by
age group
• The regional gross value added (GVA), Office for National Statistics 
Methods: We assume the proportion of people at different age groups receiving
long-term and short-term support is constant. Following the 2010 analysis, care
cost is assumed to increase by 2% under the ‘slow uptake’ scenario, remain con-




















 RateCareji2018  1  2% 
t2018
Projectedcostjit represents the projected costs of adult social care support for age
group j (j=1 or 2, 1 for those aged 16-64 and 2 for those aged 65 and over) and
support type i (i=1 or 2, 1 for LT support and 2 for ST support) in year t
(t=2018, 2019, : : : , 2060). ASCCostsji2018 is the actual gross spending on adult
social care for age group j and support type i in 2018. Populationjt is the number
of population for age group j in year t. RateCareji2018 is the ratio of people in age
group j who receive adult social care support under type i in 2018. We assume
that the economy grows at 2% based on data for the past 20 years. The projected
GVA in a specific year t is:
GVAt  GVA2018  1 2% 
t2018
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